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Abstract
This paper relies on the new Keynesian model with ination persistence to
characterize the optimal monetary and scal policy in a liquidity trap. It shows
that, with a Phillips curve that is both forward and backward looking, the monetary
policy that is implemented during a liquidity trap episode can lift the economy out
of depression. The central bank does not need to commit beyond the end of the
crisis to get some traction on the level of economic activity. Regarding scal policy,
ination persistence justies some front-loading of government expenditures to get
ination started, which reduces the real interest rate. The magnitude of the optimal
scal stimulus is decreasing in the degree of ination persistence. Finally, if ination
persistence is due to adaptive expectations, rather than to price indexation, then
monetary policy is ine¤ective while the optimal scal stimulus is large and heavily
front-loaded.
Keywords: Commitment, Ination persistence, Liquidity trap, Monetary and
scal policy
JEL Classication: E12, E52, E62, E63
1 Introduction
The Great Recession has shown that a major constraint on the conduct of economic
policy is that the nominal interest rate set by the central bank cannot be negative. The
constraint is due to the simple fact that anyone would prefer to hold cash rather than
a bond yielding a negative nominal return. When the zero lower bound is binding, the
Contact: Jean-Baptiste.Michau@polytechnique.edu
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economy is said to be in the "liquidity trap".1 This situation results in an interest rate
that is excessively high and, hence, in a level of demand that is below the production
capacity of the economy. As the experience of Japan over the last two decades has shown,
there is no mechanism through which an economy naturally escapes a liquidity trap.
The government therefore needs to intervene in order to stimulate the level of economic
activity. It can do so through expansionary scal policy. An increase in government
spending mechanically raises the level of demand. Alternatively, Krugman (1998) and
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) have shown that, in a forward looking environment, the
government can also rely on monetary policy to escape the liquidity trap. Indeed, the
policy that will be implemented by the central bank after the crisis is over can inuence
the current level of economic activity through its e¤ect on expectations. The key is for
the central bank to credibly promise to create an output boom after the crisis.
To analyze monetary and scal policy in a liquidity trap, the literature has extensively
relied on the new Keynesian model. However, this model is purely forward looking, which
implies that ination does not have any persistence. This is implausible in light of histor-
ical experiences such as the sharp recession caused by the Volcker disination episode.2
Hence, indexation of non re-optimized prices to the last observed rate of ination is rou-
tinely added to the new Keynesian model (see, for instance, Woodford 2003, Smets and
Wouters 2003 or Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans 2005), which introduces ination
persistence without departing from rational expectations.
However, the liquidity trap has never been analyzed in the presence of ination persis-
tence. The aim of this paper therefore is to characterize the optimal monetary and scal
policy in a liquidity trap under ination persistence. As we shall see, ination persistence
signicantly enhances the e¢ cacy of these policies and their ability to lift the economy
out of the trap.
There are empirical controversies about the structural degree of ination persistence.3
On the one hand, reduced form estimates show that ination persistence has declined
since the onset of the Great Moderation. On the other hand, the structural degree of
ination persistence can hardly be identied over an episode of history characterized by
low and stable ination, where the policies implemented by central banks guaranteed that
ination would always revert back to target. Moreover, while in my analysis I assume a
constant degree of ination persistence, in reality persistence is likely to uctuate over
time. It might in fact rise when the economy falls into the liquidity trap. Indeed, the
1Once the nominal rate has fallen to zero, money and short term bonds are both zero-interest-yielding
assets. Hence, an increase in the money supply through an open market operation induces agents to rely
on money rather than bonds for savings, but it does not increase the quantity of money in circulation,
i.e. the economy is literally "liquidity trapped".
2Karl Otto Pöhl, a former president of the Bundesbank, once famously remarked that "ination is
like toothpaste. Once it is out of the tube, it is hard to get it back again".
3See Fuhrer (2010) for a comprehensive survey.
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inability of the central bank to hit its target can de-anchor ination expectations, which
would increase the structural degree of ination persistence.4
For most of my analysis, I rely on the standard new Keynesian model with ination
persistence. To implement the rst-best allocation with zero ination, the nominal in-
terest rate must be equal to the natural real interest rate, which follows an exogenous
and deterministic path.5 The source of the problem is that the natural real rate becomes
negative for a xed length of time, which induces the nominal rate to hit the zero lower
bound. In that case, an active monetary or scal policy is necessary to stabilize the econ-
omy. To obtain qualitative and quantitative insights, I simulate numerically the optimal
policies.
I rst investigate monetary policy alone. The aforementioned well known result is
that, in the absence of ination persistence, the central bank can only get some grip
on the level of economic activity by promising to create an output boom after the crisis.
This requires a strong degree of commitment as this policy is not time consistent. Indeed,
generating such a boom will no longer be desirable after the crisis is over. By contrast,
I show that, if ination persistence is su¢ ciently strong, commitment beyond the end of
the crisis is not necessary to stabilize the economy. The central bank can raise ination
by committing to implement a path of positive nominal interest rates during the crisis.
To understand this result note that, without ination persistence, a rise in future
nominal rates reduces ination expectations and, hence, through the forward looking
behavior of agents, the current rate of ination. However, with ination persistence, the
lower current rate of ination further reduces future rates of ination. This e¤ect can be
so strong as to generate a never-ending feedback loop between a fall in current ination
and in future ination. In that case, the only rational expectation equilibrium is that a
rise in future nominal rates raises ination expectations which increases the current rate
of ination. This reduces the current real interest rate, which stimulates the demand for
consumption.
This result shows that the interplay between the forward and backward looking com-
ponents of the Phillips curve can make the monetary policy implemented during the
liquidity trap e¤ective. This enhances the scope of monetary policy as it is admittedly
much easier for a central bank to credibly commit during the crisis than to commit beyond
the end of the crisis.
I then turn to scal policy. Without ination persistence, if the government cannot
commit beyond the end of the crisis, then scal policy alone is responsible for avoiding
4More precisely, if ination expectations are de-anchored, then rms that do not re-optimize their
prices in a given quarter might to choose to index them to the last observed rate of ination rather than
to the target rate of ination. This mechanically raises the structural degree of ination persistence.
5The natural real interest rate is the real interest rate that would prevail in a exible price economy
and which generates a level of demand equal to the e¢ cient level of output.
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a depression. In that case, the optimal scal policy is characterized by a back-loaded
prole of government expenditures. This is due to the purely forward looking nature of
the economy: expenditures realized towards the end of the crisis stimulate the economy
when they occur, but also beforehand through their e¤ect on expectations. This optimal
policy stands in sharp contrast with the common practice of governments, which is to
opt for front-loaded stimulus packages. Clearly, such a policy does not make any sense
in a purely forward looking environment where expenditures realized at the beginning of
crisis have no persistent impact on the level of economic activity.
Ination persistence provides a countervailing force. I show that, with ination per-
sistence, the government can always spend su¢ ciently in the rst period of the crisis in
order to raise ination by a su¢ cient amount to guarantee that the zero lower bound will
never be binding in the future. Of course, this policy of "pump priming" the economy
requires a huge amount of government expenditures in the rst period and is therefore
unlikely to be optimal. However, this example shows that ination persistence makes a
front loading of government expenditures desirable. Simulations show that, for a strong
degree of ination persistence, the optimal scal stimulus is mostly front-loaded. For an
intermediate degree of ination persistence, and in the absence of support from monetary
policy,6 it is double-peaked: government expenditures are concentrated towards the very
beginning and the very end of the crisis.
Simulations also show that ination persistence substantially reduces the magnitude of
the scal stimulus that is necessary to stabilize the economy. The interaction between the
forward and the backward looking components of the Phillips curve enhance the e¢ cacy
of the scal stimulus. The backward looking component allows ination to get started,
while the forward looking component ensures that the expectation of future ination
raises current ination.
While most of the paper investigates ination persistence within a rational expec-
tation framework, in a nal section, I consider the possibility that ination persistence
results from backward looking expectations. If agents form adaptive expectations, then
the Phillips curve is purely backward looking. In that case, monetary policy is ine¤ective
while scal policy is less e¢ cient than before. Indeed, in the absence of a forward look-
ing component to the Phillips curve, future government spending cannot raise ination
expectations. Thus, a much larger stimulus package in needed to stabilize the economy.
The optimal scal stimulus is heavily front-loaded.
Related Literature. Keynes (1936) and Hicks (1937) were both aware of the possibility
of the economy falling into a liquidity trap.7 However, this phenomenon was seen as a
6In fact, when the government cannot commit beyond the end of the crisis and when persistence is
not very high, it turns out to be optimal to rely on scal policy alone to stabilize the economy.
7Keynes (1936): "There is a possibility [...] that, after the interest rate has fallen to a certain
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purely theoretical scenario until the Japanese nominal interest rate hit the zero lower
bound in the mid-1990s. This event led to the emergence of a substantial literature on
the topic, starting with Krugman (1998). A considerable amount of attention has been
devoted to the policy response that is needed to lift the economy out of the liquidity trap.
Following Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), the literature has extensively relied on the
new Keynesian framework in order to analyze the extent to which policy interventions
can exploit the forward looking behavior of agents. Let us now review the candidate
solutions to the liquidity trap.
A rst obvious solution to the problem would be to switch to electronic money. In
the absence of cash, the zero lower bound simply disappears. However, such a radical
modication of the monetary system is unlikely to be adopted in the foreseeable future.8
As an alternative, Correia, Farhi, Nicolini and Teles (2013) have shown that, in a new
Keynesian model, it is possible to implement a scal policy that exactly replicates the
allocation of resources that would result from a negative nominal interest rate. The
government needs to implement a rising path of consumption taxes, which induces agents
to front-load their consumption. This, however, creates a rising distortion to labor supply,
which can be o¤set by a declining path of labor income taxes. Similarly, a rising capital
subsidy also needs to be implemented. This policy is time-consistent and implements
the rst-best allocation of resources. However, if governments are unable or unwilling to
implement such a radical change to their tax code, they then have to rely on monetary
and conventional scal policy, i.e. government spending, to prevent a depression.
The traditional view of the liquidity trap is that monetary policy is completely inef-
fective. When the nominal interest rate is down to zero, an increase in the money supply
through an open market operation induces agents to rely on money rather than bonds
for savings. This does not a¤ect the allocation of resources. Increasing the money supply
is therefore like pushing on a rope.9 Krugman (1998), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003),
Jung, Teranishi and Watanabe (2005) and Werning (2012) have shown that, if agents are
forward looking, then the monetary policy that will be implemented after the crisis is
over can stimulate the level of demand during the crisis. However, as already mentioned,
level, liquidity-preference may become virtually absolute in the sense that almost everyone prefers cash to
holding a debt which yields so low a rate of interest. In this event the monetary authority would have lost
e¤ective control over the rate of interest. But whilst this limiting case might become practically important
in future, I know of no example of it hitherto."
Hicks (1937): "If the cost of holding money can be neglected, it will always be protable to hold money
rather than lend it out, if the rate of interest is not greater than zero. Consequently the rate of interest
must always be positive. [...] If IS lies to the left [of LM], we cannot [increase employment by increasing
the quantity of money]; merely monetary means will not force down the rate of interest any further."
8See Rogo¤ (2014) for a discussion of the costs and benets of disposing of paper currency.
9Chen, Curdia and Ferrero (2012) have shown that, under segmented asset markets, a large increase
in the money supply, i.e. quantitative easing, can stimulate aggregate demand through a reduction in
long term interest rates.
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the central bank must be able to credibly commit to implement a policy that is not
time consistent. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) have shown that this can be achieved
through price level targeting.10 Should the central bank be unable to adopt such a policy,
the government has to resort to public spending to stimulate aggregate demand.
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011), Woodford (2011) and Farhi and Werning
(2013) have shown that the scal multiplier is much larger in a liquidity trap than in
normal times.11 The reason is simple: in normal times, an increase in government expen-
ditures generates an inationary pressure to which the central bank responds by sharply
increasing the nominal interest rate. This raises the real interest rate, which annihilates
most of the stimulative impact of the expansionary scal policy. By contrast, in a liq-
uidity trap, the nominal rate is stuck against the zero lower bound while the inationary
e¤ect of government spending reduces the real rate, which strengthens the e¢ cacy of
the stimulus.12 My simulation results show that the magnitude of the scal stimulus
necessary to stabilize the economy is decreasing in the degree of ination persistence.
This suggests that persistence further increases the magnitude of the scal multiplier in
a liquidity trap.
Werning (2012) has characterized, within the new Keynesian model, the optimal time
path of government expenditures during a liquidity trap episode. Interestingly he dis-
tinguishes "opportunistic" from "stimulus" spending. The former is the mechanical re-
sponse to a fall in the opportunity cost of public expenditures, and is therefore always
countercyclical; while the latter corresponds to the spending realized for purely stimula-
tive purposes. Werning (2012) has shown that, under full commitment, monetary policy
does most of the job of stabilizing the economy and, hence, the stimulus component can
be equal to zero. By contrast, under discretionary monetary policy, a scal authority
that can commit should implement a positive stimulus component of government expen-
ditures. Moreover, the stimulus component should be back-loaded, which, as discussed
above, is not surprising in a purely forward looking environment.
Finally, the zero lower bound has reinvigorated the debate on the optimal rate of
ination. Williams (2009) and Blanchard, DellAriccia and Mauro (2010) argued that
raising the target rate of ination from 2 to 4 percent would leave more room for cutting
nominal rates in crisis time, which would reduce the likelihood of falling into the liquidity
10Eggertsson (2006) showed that, if taxes are distortionary, increasing public debt can be a credible
way to signal that the central bank will tolerate higher ination in the future. In a similar vein, Bhattarai,
Eggertsson and Gafarov (2013) have argued that quantitative easing can credibly signal the willingness
of the central bank to keep nominal rates low after the crisis.
11DeLong and Summers (2012) and Denes, Eggertsson and Gilbukh (2013) even argued that, in a liq-
uidity trap, the multiplier is so large that a rise in government spending might enhance the sustainability
of public debt.
12While most of the literature investigates the e¤ect of an increase in public spending, Eggertsson
(2010) also analyzes the stimulative impact of various tax cuts. He argues that tax cuts are expansionary
if they increase demand; but, if they increase supply, they are deationary and, hence, contractionary.
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trap. Billi (2011) has shown that, if the central bank cannot commit to implement a
very accommodative monetary policy in the future, then the optimal rate of ination is
above 8 percent. By contrast, Coibion, Gorodnichenko and Wieland (2012) found that
the optimal rate of ination is always small, around 2 percent. The di¤erence is partly
due to their assumption of a much lower degree of ination persistence than in Billi
(2011). Ball (2013) also emphasizes ination persistence has a major justication for
raising the ination target. These results are obtained under the assumption of a fairly
low probability of hitting the zero lower bound, which is questionable given the rising
concern about "secular stagnation", according to which the natural real interest rate has
permanently fallen (see, for instance, Eggertsson and Mehrotra 2014). My paper does
not directly contribute to the debate on the optimal ination target since, in my analysis,
I normalize the steady state rate of ination to zero. However, I show that ination
persistence makes it easier to stabilize the economy through monetary or scal policy,
which somewhat reduces the case for higher ination in normal times.
2 Monetary Policy
To begin this section, I introduce the new Keynesian model with ination persistence. I
then rely on this framework to investigate the optimal monetary policy.
2.1 New Keynesian Model with Ination Persistence
The analysis relies on the standard newKeynesian model with ination persistence. There
is a continuum of goods produced by monopolistically competitive producers. At each
point in time, a representative agent chooses his labor supply and his demand for each
consumption good such as to maximize his intertemporal utility. He discounts the future
at rate . His elasticity of substitution across goods is equal to , the inverse of his Frisch
elasticity of labor supply is equal to  and the inverse of his intertemporal elasticity of
substitution of consumption is equal to .
Aggregate demand has two components: private consumption and government ex-
penditures. Let Y , C and G denote the steady state levels of output, consumption and
government expenditures, respectively. Thus, Y = C + G. As in this section I focus on
monetary policy alone, I assume that government spending is always equal to its steady
state level G.
Each rm employs labor such as to produce its own variety of goods. The production
function is Y = N1 . Calvo pricing implies that, in any given period, a monopolistically
competitive rm only has a probability 1    of being able to reset its price. Following
Woodford (2003), Smets and Wouters (2003) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans
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(2005), among others, ination persistence is introduced by assuming that, in the absence
of re-optimization, prices are indexed to ination. More specically, the index attaches a
weight ! to the previously observed rate of ination and the remaining weight 1   ! to
the trend rate of ination. For simplicity, and without loss of generality, the trend rate
of ination is normalized to zero.
Importantly, I assume throughout that there is no aggregate uncertainty. Hence, there
is perfect foresight about the future. Let ct denote the deviation of consumption from its
natural level normalized by the steady state output level. More formally:
ct = ln

Ct
Cnt

C
Y
 Ct   C
n
t
Y
, (1)
where Ct denotes the actual level of consumption at t while Cnt denotes the natural level
of consumption at t.13 A log-linear approximation around the steady state to the optimal
price setting decisions of rms yields the (hybrid) new Keynesian Phillips curve:
t   !t 1 =  (t+1   !t) + ct, (2)
where t denotes the rate of ination from t  1 to t and the parameter  is equal to:
 =
 + + (1  )Y=C
1 +  (  1)
1  

(1  ) . (3)
Thus,  is non-negative and increasing in the degree of price exibility, i.e.  is decreasing
in . A key parameter of my analysis is ! which determines the degree of ination
persistence. If ! = 0, there is no ination persistence and (2) reduces to the standard
new Keynesian Phillips curve. If ! = 1, there is full indexation to past ination, which
implies that, in the absence of re-optimization, prices at t are automatically increased by
the previously observed rate of ination, t 1.
The other building block of the new Keynesian model is the consumption Euler equa-
tion, which, after log-linearization, is given by:
ct =   1
Y=C
(it   t+1   rnt ) + ct+1, (4)
where it denotes the nominal interest rate and rnt the natural real interest rate, which is
the real interest rate that would prevail in a exible price economy. In other words, for
the economy to produce at full capacity, the real interest rate it t+1 needs to be always
equal to its natural counterpart rnt . This natural real interest rate r
n
t is exogenous to the
13The natural level of consumption corresponds to the consumption level that prevails in a exible
price economy in the absence of government intervention, other than a steady state level of spending
maintained at G.
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model. A fundamental constraint to the conduct of monetary policy is that the nominal
interest rate it cannot be negative:
it  0. (5)
Indeed, money is an asset that always yields a zero nominal return. Thus, agents would
always prefer to hold money for savings rather than bonds yielding a negative nominal
return.
The dynamics of the economy are fully characterized by the new Keynesian Phillips
curve with a given initial rate of ination equal to 0 and by the Euler equation where
the nominal interest rate it is set by the central bank. Monopolistic competition implies
that the equilibrium of the exible price economy is ine¢ cient. Let us therefore assume
that the government implements a proportional employment subsidy, nanced by a lump
sum tax, which o¤sets this ine¢ ciency. We can then consider that the natural level of
consumption coincides with the optimal level of consumption.
The aim of the central bank is to minimize the following loss function:
1X
t=1
t
h
(t   !t 1)2 + 

c2t
i
. (6)
The negative of this loss function corresponds to a second-order approximation to the
utility function of consumers around the steady state. The ination term captures the
welfare loss from relative price distortions. Indeed, when ! = 0, ination under Calvo
pricing introduces a distortion between newly reset prices and older prices. With full
indexation, when ! = 1, it is only changes in the rate of ination, t   t 1, that
introduce relative price distortions. Finally, with partial indexation, when ! 2 (0; 1),
relative price distortions occur unless t = !t 1 for all t, in which case rms that can
reset their price choose not to deviate from the indexation rule.
The optimal monetary policy is obtained by minimizing the loss function (6) with
respect to the nominal interest rates it for t  1 subject to the new Keynesian Phillips
curve (2) with 0 given, to the Euler equation (4) and to the zero lower bound (5).
The loss function implies that, at any time t, the rst-best allocation of resources is
characterized by t = !t 1 and ct = 0. If the zero lower bound on the nominal interest
rate is never binding, then this allocation can easily be implemented by setting it =
t+1 + r
n
t = !
t+10 + r
n
t for all t  1.14
In order to investigate a liquidity trap scenario, I assume that, for exogenous reasons,
the level of demand is weak from time 1 until time T , which is characterized by a natural
real interest rate rnt that is negative from time 1 until T and positive afterwards. This
14In this paper, I focus on optimal allocations and do not specify the policy rules that prevent the
occurrence of multiple equilibria. Typically, these rules impose a sharp rise (fall) in the nominal interest
rate if ination or consumption is higher (lower) than in the optimal allocation.
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implies that, starting with an ination rate which is at or below trend, i.e. 0  0, the
rst-best allocation cannot be implemented.15 More specically, for my analysis, I will
rely on the standard step function:
rnt =
(
r if 1  t  T
r if T + 1  t (7)
where r > 0 and r < 0. Candidate explanations for the persistence of a very low level of
the natural real rate include population aging, a process of deleveraging or a rise in the
concentration of wealth among individuals with a low propensity to consume. However,
endogenizing the evolution of the natural real rate is beyond the scope of my analysis.
2.2 Calibration
Throughout the paper, I perform numerical simulations to investigate the main qualita-
tive and quantitative properties of optimal monetary and scal policy. I therefore rely on
a standard quarterly calibration of the new Keynesian model. The preference parameters
are set as follows: the discount rate  is set equal to 0:99, the elasticity of substitution
across goods  to 6, the Frisch elasticity of labor supply 1= to 0:5 and the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution of consumption 1= to 1 (which corresponds to a logarithmic
utility of consumption). The steady state output level Y is normalized to 1. As invest-
ment is absent from the model, steady state consumption C is set 0:8 and government
expenditures G to 0:2. On the production side, the steady state labor share 1   is set
equal to 2=3 and the Calvo parameter of price stickiness  to 2=3, which implies an av-
erage price duration of three quarters. These parameters imply, by (3), that the Phillips
curve parameter  is approximately equal to 0:20.
I consider a scenario where the natural real interest rate rnt remains negative for 5
years, i.e. T = 20 quarters. The step function is symmetric with a natural real interest
rate equal to  2% per year during the crisis, i.e. r =  0:005, and equal to 2% afterwards,
i.e. r = 0:005. For simplicity, I assume that the initial rate of ination 0 is equal to 0%.
The persistence parameter ! is at the heart of my analysis. I therefore consider the
two benchmark cases with no ination persistence, ! = 0, and with full indexation, ! = 1.
More realistically, I also consider the case where ! = 0:51=4 ' 0:841. Recall that in a
rst-best allocation ination follows t = !t 1 or, equivalently, t+4 = !4t. Starting
from a strictly positive rate of ination, the indexation parameter ! = 0:51=4 implies that,
along the optimal path, ination is halved every year, i.e. t+4 = 0:5t. This corresponds
15If the steady state rate of ination is not set equal to zero, then the analysis is unchanged provided
that the natural real interest rate is lowered by the steady state rate of ination. For instance, with a
steady state ination rate equal to 2%, the natural real rate needs to fall below -2% for the zero lower
bound to be binding and for the economy to fall into the liquidity trap.
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to a plausible degree of ination persistence. Relying on quarterly U.S. data from 1960 to
2004, Milani (2007) estimates that, under rational expectations, ! = 0:885. In his analysis
of the optimal rate of ination, Billi (2011) assumes ! = 0:9. While the value ! ' 0:841
seems reasonable, it must be acknowledged that there remains a considerable amount of
controversy in the literature about the structural degree of ination persistence.
2.3 Monetary Policy without Ination Persistence
Let us begin by analyzing monetary policy in the standard new Keynesian model without
ination persistence, when ! = 0. The main characteristics of the optimal monetary
policy in a liquidity trap when ! = 0 are already well known from the analyses of
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Jung, Teranishi and Watanabe (2005) and Werning
(2012).16 It provides a useful benchmark against which to compare the e¤ects of ination
persistence.
Figure 1 displays the optimal monetary policy and the corresponding allocation of
resources under full commitment.17 The thin dotted line displays the exogenous path
of the natural real interest rate rnt , which is negative for 20 consecutive quarters. The
optimal monetary policy is given by the thin solid line, which is the path of the nominal
interest rate it to which the central bank must commit. This policy seems broadly
successful at stabilizing the output gap ct, represented by the thick solid line, which
uctuates around its natural level. It also generates some ination t during the crisis,
as shown by the thick dashed line. The real interest rate rt = it   t+1 is given by thin
dashed line.
To understand the logic of the optimal monetary policy with commitment, it is useful
to consider rst what happens in the absence of commitment. After the crisis is over,
from the 21st quarter onwards, the central bank wishes to set the nominal interest rate
it equal to the natural real interest rate rnt = r > 0 forever such as to implement the
rst-best allocation, i.e. ct = t = 0 for all t  T + 1. However, the anticipation of this
policy has disastrous consequences during the crisis. Indeed, if the economy produces
at full capacity with no ination at T + 1, then the zero lower bound on the nominal
interest rate forces the real interest rate at time T , rT = iT   T+1 = 0, to be above
the natural real interest rate, rnT = r < 0. This depresses the output level at T . Indeed,
the Euler equation (4) with iT   T+1 = 0 gives cT = r=(Y=C) < 0. The depressed
output level induces rms to cut their prices which generates deation. By the Phillips
curve (2), we have T = cT < 0. But, deation at T implies an even wider gap between
the real interest rate at T   1, rT 1 = iT 1   T =  T > 0, and the natural real rate,
16Note that Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) do not rely on a fully deterministic setup as they assume
that, each period, there is a constant probability that the natural real interest rate becomes positive.
17The optimal monetary policy problems are formally solved in appendix A.
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Figure 1: Optimal monetary policy with full commitment when ! = 0
rnT 1 = r < 0. This causes an even larger depression in the output level at time T   1,
which generates even more deation at T   1; and so on. The economy is caught in a
vicious deationary spiral throughout the liquidity trap.
Figure 2 displays the path of consumption and ination under the optimal monetary
policy when the central bank cannot commit beyond time T , in which case it = 0 for
t  T and it = r for t  T + 1. Clearly, the absence of commitment has disastrous
consequences, even though the linearization of the model around the steady state does
not seem appropriate for a quantitative investigation of a phenomenon of this magnitude.
As illustrated by Figure 1, the key to avoid the deationary spiral is to commit to
keeping the nominal interest rate it equal to 0 for some time after the crisis is over. This
induces the real interest rate to be below the natural real rate, which generates an output
boom after the crisis is over. As the pricing behavior of rms is forward looking, this
output boom creates ination both during the boom and beforehand, i.e. during the
crisis.
The remarkable feature of the optimal policy is that keeping the nominal rate equal
to zero for only three quarters after the crisis is over is su¢ cient to completely eliminate
the vicious deationary spiral. Indeed, as can be seen from Figure 1, the optimal policy
generates just enough ination for the real interest rate to be almost equal to the natural
real rate during most of the crisis.
In sum, when ! = 0, the central bank can only stabilize the level of economic activity
12
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Figure 2: Optimal monetary policy with no commitment beyond T when ! = 0
if it can commit beyond time T . This is the key insight, initially emphasized by Krugman
(1998), that the central bank needs to "credibly promise to be irresponsible".
2.4 Monetary Policy with Ination Persistence
Let us now investigate how ination persistence modies the optimal conduct of mone-
tary policy with full commitment. For simplicity, I begin by analyzing the full indexation
benchmark where ! = 1. Figure 3 displays the optimal monetary policy and the corre-
sponding allocation of resources.
Recall that, when ! = 1, the rst-best allocation is characterized by ct = 0 and t =
t 1. This immediately follows from the specication of the loss function, given by (6).
The rst remarkable result from Figure 3 is that the optimal monetary policy implements
the rst-best allocation well before the end of the crisis. Indeed, from the eleventh
quarter onwards, the output gap is virtually equal to zero and ination is constant.
Thus, commitment beyond the end of the crisis is not necessary to stabilize the economy.
The rst-best allocation can be implemented thanks to ination being high enough to
allow the real interest to be equal to the natural real interest rate, despite the zero lower
bound. Thus, to understand the optimal policy, we need to perform a detailed analysis of
the dynamics of ination. To this end, it is useful to consolidate the Euler equation and
the new Keynesian Phillips curve into a single expression for ination. For generality, I
allow for any degree ! of ination persistence. Let us consider that the economy is in a
13
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Figure 3: Optimal monetary policy with full commitment when ! = 1
rst-best allocation from time N + 1 onwards, where N can be arbitrarily large. Thus,
ct = 0 and t = !t 1 for all t  N +1. Iterating forward on the Euler equation (4) until
time N , and imposing cN+1 = 0, yields:
ct =   1
Y=C
NX
k=t
(ik   k+1   rnk ) . (8)
Similarly, iterating forward on the Phillips curve (2) until N , and imposing N+1 = !N ,
yields:
t   !t 1 = 
NX
k=t
k tck. (9)
Substituting the rst equation into the second, and rearranging terms, gives:
t   !t 1 =   
Y=C
NX
k=t
1  k+1 t
1   (ik   k+1   r
n
k ) , (10)
for any t 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng. This expression fully characterizes the dynamics of ination.
The initial rise in ination is driven by the forward looking component of the Phillips
curve. In Figure 3, agents anticipate that the real interest rate will be below the natural
real rate between the fourth and the ninth quarter, which, by (10), generates a rising
path of ination. Note that, as lim!1(1   k+1 t)=(1   ) = k + 1   t, gaps between
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the real rate and the natural real rate have a larger impact on ination if they occur at
a distant point in the future than if they happen soon. This explains why, in Figure 3, a
very small gap between the two rates more than one year ahead is su¢ cient to generate
a sizeable increase in ination.
We have now seen how the expectation of high ination in the future makes it possible
to implement low future real interest rates that raise the current rate of ination. The
deeper question is: How can the central bank, through its choice of future nominal interest
rates, generate high ination expectations? Before answering this question, it should be
emphasized that, given a path of nominal interest rates until time N chosen by the central
bank, there is a unique allocation of consumption and ination that is consistent with
the boundary condition that the economy must be in a rst-best allocation from time
N + 1 onwards, where N is arbitrarily large.18
It may of course seem surprising that the central bank is able to generate ination ex-
pectations by committing to implement strictly positive nominal rates in the future. This
would not be possible without ination persistence. To understand the corresponding in-
tuition, note that the usual mechanism is that an increase in future nominal rates raises
future real rates, which reduces ination expectations and, through the forward looking
behavior of agents, the current rate of ination. However, with ination persistence, a
lower current rate of ination further reduces ination expectations. If this feedback loop
is strong enough, there is no corresponding rational expectation equilibrium. In that
case, the only equilibrium is that a rise in future nominal rates raises ination expecta-
tions su¢ ciently to reduce future real rates. This, through the forward looking behavior
of agents, increases current ination, which, through ination persistence, raises future
ination, consistently with agentsexpectations.
To illustrate this mechanism, let us start by considering an extreme example where a
rise in the current nominal interest rate raises current ination. In such a case, the rst-
best allocation can be reached as soon as time 2, where c2 = 0 and 2 = !1. Equation
18Uniqueness is straightforward to prove. Select an arbitrarily large value of N and impose that the
economy is in a rst-best allocation from time N+1 onwards. Given some value of N+1, we immediately
obtain N = N+1=!. Then, N 1 can be obtained from (10) evaluated at t = N . We can then proceed
recursively with equation (10) to obtain the whole trajectory of ination until 0. But, as (10) is a linear
equation, the recursive substitutions yields a linear relationship between N+1 and 0. Thus, there is a
unique value of N+1 consistent with the preset value of 0. This value of N+1 fully characterizes the
path of ination and, through (8), of consumption. Note that for a given value of N , such an equilibrium
only exists if, for all t  N + 1, we have it = t+1 + rnt = !t NN + rnt  0; as, otherwise, it is not
possible to set a nominal interest rate consistent with the economy being in a rst-best allocation from
N + 1 onwards. This uniqueness result does not hold if N is not nite. See Cochrane (2014) for a
detailed analysis of that case. Note, however, that the government can implement a policy rule from
N+1 onwards, such as the Taylor rule, that ensures that the rst-best allocation is the only non-explosive
allocation. Such a rule arguably makes it natural to consider that N is nite.
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(10) evaluated at t = 1 and with N = 1 gives:
1   !0 =   
Y=C
(i1   2   rn1 ) . (11)
Using the fact that 2 = !1 and rearranging terms yields:

Y=C
!   1

1 =

Y=C
(i1   rn1 )  !0. (12)
Thus, if ! > (Y=C)=, then 1 is increasing in i1. In that case, to reach the rst-best
allocation as soon as time 2, the central bank just needs to raise i1 by a su¢ cient amount
to make sure that ination is going to be high enough in the future to guarantee that the
zero lower bound will never be binding again.19
While the above example focuses on a single time period, the feedback loops at work
are even more powerful over longer horizons. To illustrate this, consider a situation where
the rst-best allocation can be reached at time 3, where c3 = 0 and 3 = !2. Now,
equation (10) with N = 2 evaluated at t = 2 and t = 1, respectively, gives:
2   !1 =   
Y=C
(i2   3   rn2 ) , (13)
and:
1   !0 =   
Y=C
(i1   2   rn1 ) 

Y=C
(1 + ) (i2   3   rn2 ) . (14)
The usual mechanism is that an increase in i2 raises r2 = i2   3 which reduces both 1,
by (14), and 2, by (13). Furthermore, the fall in 1 is strengthened by the fall in 2,
which raises r1 = i1 2. The crucial accelerating factor is ination persistence which, by
(13), implies that the fall in 1 amplies the fall in 2. In fact, if ! is su¢ ciently close to
1, then, by (13), 2 must drop by more than 1 (for a xed value of 3). But, at the same
time, by (14), = (Y=C)  1 is a su¢ cient condition to ensure that 1 drops by more
than 2 (for a xed value of 3). This clearly is inconsistent with a rational expectation
equilibrium. All this occurs in addition to the previously identied feedback loop through
which a fall in 2 induces, by ination persistence, a fall in 3, which increases r2 = i2 3
and further reduces 2.
When ! is large enough, the only rational expectation equilibrium consistent with the
economy reaching a rst-best allocation at time 3 is that a rise in i2 induces an even larger
rise in the expected future rate of ination 3, which reduces r2 = i2   3 and increases
2. The pricing decision of rms being forward looking, the expected increase in both
19It follows from footnote 18 that the desired equilibrium of the central bank is unique when we impose
the boundary condition that the economy is in a rst-best allocation from time ~N + 1 onwards, for any
given ~N such that ~N + 1  N + 1 = 2. If ~N + 1 > N + 1, the central bank needs to commit to the path
of the nominal interest rate from time 2 to ~N that is consistent with the rst-best allocation.
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2 and 3 generates a rise (or a smaller fall) in 1. Ination persistence implies that the
rise (or the smaller fall) in 1 will raise 2 and the rise in 2 will raise 3, consistently
with agents expectations. This intuition is formally conrmed by combining the two
equations above such as to eliminate 1 and by using 3 = !2. This yields:

Y=C
! (2 + !(1 + ))  1

2 =

Y=C
! (i1   rn1 ) (15)
+

Y=C
[1 + !(1 + )] (i2   rn2 )  !20.
Thus, 2 is increasing in both i1 and i2 provided that ! (2 + !(1 + )) > (Y=C)=, which
is a much weaker condition on ! than in the one period example (where the condition
was ! > (Y=C)=).
When comparing Figure 1 and 3, it is tempting to conclude that the ability of the
central bank to create ination during the liquidity trap is due to the fact that ination
remains high after the crisis is over. However, this is not the main mechanism at work.
Even if we impose the boundary condition that the economy must be in a rst-best
allocation with zero ination from time N +1 onwards, i.e. ct = t = 0 for all t  N +1,
it is still possible for the central bank to raise ination by committing to a specic path of
nominal rates until time N provided that ination persistence is strong enough. Indeed,
the two period example above with N set equal to 2 shows that, even if 3 must be equal
to zero, it is possible to raise 2 by increasing i1 or i2. This illustrates that there are
enough feedback loops over a multi-period horizon to make it possible to raise ination
by increasing nominal rates, even if the end-point is characterized by zero ination.
Werning (2012) forcefully emphasized that the stance of monetary policy is determined
by the amount of ination it generates, not by the level of the nominal interest rate.
Indeed, he shows that more accommodative monetary policies generate ination which
could eventually result in a higher nominal rate. Things are even sharper with ination
persistence where it is the rise in nominal rates that can directly generate ination.20
In Figure 3, the most important consequence of the implementation of a rst-best
allocation before the end of the crisis is that the central bank does not need to com-
mit beyond time T to be able to stabilize the economy. This is a direct implication of
the ability of the central bank to stimulate ination through positive nominal interest
rates during the crisis. Indeed, the above examples show that no commitment is nec-
essary when ! > (Y=C)= and commitment for one period ahead is su¢ cient when
! (2 + !(1 + )) > (Y=C)=.
20Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2013) have also argued that raising nominal interest rates can boost
ination expectations in a liquidity trap. However the underlying mechanism is completely di¤erent. In
their framework, there is a non-fundamental condence shock that results in multiple equilibria. The
liquidity trap is an adverse equilibrium caused by a negative condence shock. Higher interest rates
signal higher future ination and therefore generate ination expectations.
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This is an important result to the extent that it is presumably much easier for a
central bank to credibly commit to a certain path of the nominal rate during the crisis,
i.e. when the natural real rate is still negative, than after the crisis is over. Indeed, while
the Federal Reserve and other major central banks have engaged in forward guidance,
none of them has credibly committed to behave "irresponsibly" once their economy will
have recovered. Thus, ination persistence considerably enhances the ability of central
banks to steer their economies out of liquidity traps.
As already hinted, even if the central bank can only commit up to time S, with
S < T , it is possible to reach the rst-best allocation by the end of the commitment
period provided that ination is raised by a su¢ cient amount to ensure that the zero
lower bound will not be binding in the future. More precisely, to implement a rst-best
allocation from S + 1 onwards, S must be greater or equal to  r=!T+1 S > 0.21 Of
course, while it is interesting to know that the rst-best allocation can be reached as soon
as time S + 1, this does not necessarily characterize the optimal monetary policy.
Let us now investigate quantitatively the more plausible case where prices are only
partially indexed to ination. Figure 4 displays the optimal monetary policy and the
corresponding allocation under full commitment when ! = 0:51=4 ' 0:841.
Note that, in the 21st quarter, the real interest rate is below the natural real rate.
The central bank therefore commits to be "irresponsible" and to create an output boom
after the crisis is over, as in an economy without ination persistence. However, the
"irresponsible" behavior is much milder than in the standard new Keynesian model of
Figure 1, where the real rate remains below the natural rate for three consecutive quarters.
By comparing Figure 1 and 4, we can also observe that ination persistence enhances the
ability of the central bank to stabilize the economy. Indeed, the real interest rate tracks
the natural real rate much more closely with persistence than without, which results in
smaller uctuations of the output gap.
Figure 4 shows that, when ! = 0:841, the central bank uses its ability to commit
beyond time T , which must therefore be valuable. It is therefore interesting to investigate
the optimal monetary policy when the central bank can only credibly commit up to time
T , but not beyond. It is represented in Figure 5.
As expected, the inability of the central bank to commit beyond time T results in
larger uctuations in both the output gap and ination. It is nevertheless remarkable
that the monetary policy implemented during the crisis manages, on its own, to stabilize
21To be in a rst-best allocation from S+1 onwards, the real interest rate must be equal to the natural
real rate and the zero lower bound must never be binding. Thus, we must have it = t+1 + rnt  0 for
all t  S + 1. But, we know that t = !t 1 when t  S + 1, which implies t = !t SS . Hence, the
condition simplies to it = !t+1 SS + rnt  0 for all t  S + 1. As !t+1 SS is weakly decreasing in t
and as rn1 = r
n
2 = ::: = r
n
T = r < 0, a necessary and su¢ cient condition is iT = !
T+1 SS + rnT  0 or,
equivalently, S   r=!T+1 S .
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Figure 4: Optimal monetary policy with full commitment when ! = 0:841
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Figure 5: Optimal monetary policy with commitment up to T when ! = 0:841
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the economy.
The central bank commits to a sequence of positive nominal interest rates during
the second half of the crisis. This generates ination expectations beforehand, i.e. in
the rst half of the crisis. These expectations reduce the real interest rate, which raises
output and, hence, ination, as expected by agents. The positive nominal interest rates
are implemented before the end of the crisis. This allows the central bank to sharply
reduce the nominal interest rate towards the end of the crisis while ination is high and
persistent. This mechanically reduces the real rate, which generates an output boom
that further increases ination. As ination is forward looking, this further stimulates
ination expectations in the rst half of the crisis. The rise in the nominal rate around
the 16th quarter is quite sharp such as to increase the real rate, which reduces output
relative to its future boom level. This helps stabilize the output gap. Finally, from time
T + 1 onwards, there is no commitment and the zero lower bound on the nominal rate is
no longer binding. Hence, once the crisis is over, the rst-best allocation is implemented.
2.5 Welfare Analysis
To quantify the value of commitment beyond time T , let us now perform a welfare analysis
for di¤erent values of the persistence parameter !. For any allocation of consumption and
ination, we can compute the corresponding social welfare loss using (6). However, the
magnitude of this loss has no clear interpretation. Thus, to obtain a meaningful measure
of welfare, I dene an "output gap equivalent social welfare loss" denoted by c. Formally,
c is the solution to following equation:
1X
t=1
t
h
(t   !t 1)2 + 

c2t
i
=
TX
t=1
t


c2. (16)
Hence, by denition, the welfare loss from imperfect stabilization of consumption and
ination (the left hand side) is as large as the welfare loss from a rst-best allocation
except for an output gap of magnitude c for the duration of the crisis (the right hand
side).
The output gap equivalent social welfare losses from imperfect stabilization are re-
ported in Table 1. For instance, without ination persistence, i.e. ! = 0, and under full
commitment, uctuations in consumption and ination reduce welfare by as much as a
2.22% output gap throughout the crisis.22
22To be precise, given the denition of the output gap given by (1), the 2.22% output gap corresponds
to a deviation of consumption from its natural level equal to 2.22% of the steady state level of output.
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! = 0 ! = 0:841 ! = 1
Full commitment 2.22% 0.54% 0.32%
Commitment up to time T 1471.88% 0.71% 0.32%
Table 1: Output gap equivalent social welfare loss from imperfect stabilization
Table 1 conrms that, in the absence of ination persistence, commitment beyond
time T is essential to stabilize the economy.23 By contrast, with full indexation of prices
to ination, commitment beyond time T is useless under the proposed calibration of the
model. This follows from the fact that the rst-best allocation is reached even before
the end of the crisis, as seen in Figure 3. Finally, in the intermediary case of partial
indexation, commitment beyond T is valuable, but clearly not essential to stabilize the
economy during the crisis.
The other interesting result from Table 1 is that, for any degree of commitment,
ination persistence makes it considerably easier for the central bank to stabilize the
level of economic activity during a liquidity trap episode. This stands in sharp contrast
with the common wisdom that, in normal times, ination persistence is a destabilizing
force.
Table 2 shows that, if the initial rate of ination 0 is set equal to -0.025, i.e. -10%
per year, instead of 0, then an intermediate degree of ination persistence is ideal to
stabilize the economy. Indeed, a very strong degree of persistence makes it harder to
escape from the initial stage of strong deation. Hence, partial indexation is preferable
to full indexation. When ! = 0, the model is purely forward looking and therefore
independent from the initial rate of ination 0.
! = 0 ! = 0:841 ! = 1
Full commitment 2.22% 1.41% 1.89%
Commitment up to time T 1471.88% 1.49% 1.89%
Table 2: Output gap equivalent social welfare loss when 0 =  0:025
3 Fiscal Policy
Let us now investigate the extent to which scal policy can help stabilize the economy in
a liquidity trap with ination persistence.
23When ! = 0 and commitment beyond T is not possible, the deviations of output and ination from
the steady state are so large that the log-linearized model cannot reliably quantify the huge magnitude
of the welfare loss from imperfect stabilization.
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3.1 New Keynesian Model with Government Expenditures and
Ination Persistence
Following Woodford (2011) and Werning (2012), the new Keynesian model of the pre-
vious section can easily be extended to allow for variations in government expenditures.
The government relies on lump sum taxes to buy goods from each monopolistically com-
petitive producer. In steady state, this results in an aggregate level G of government
expenditures. Let gt denote the deviation of government expenditures from its steady
state level, normalized by the steady state level of output. Thus, by denition:
gt = ln

Gt
G

G
Y
 Gt  G
Y
, (17)
where Gt denotes the level of government expenditures at t. The new Keynesian Phillips
curve, obtained by log-linearizing the optimal price setting decision of rms around the
steady state, is:
t   !t 1 =  [t+1   !t] +  [ct + (1   ) gt] , (18)
where  is dened as before, by (3). The parameter   is equal to:
  =
(1  )Y=C
 + + (1  )Y=C . (19)
It corresponds to the scal multiplier of the exible price economy. Under exible prices,
agents respond to higher government expenditures by working more and by consuming
less. Hence, the scal multiplier is always between 0 and 1, i.e.   2 (0; 1).
If  =1, agents have a zero intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption.
In that case, the wage rate, and hence the real marginal cost of production, is determined
by intertemporal substitution in consumption, since agents require an innite increase in
their current wage in order to accept working and consuming a little more at present.
This results in  =1. It follows that government expenditures have a negligible impact
on marginal cost and on ination, as conrmed by the fact that   = 1. By contrast, if
 = 0, agents have an innite intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The wage rate,
and hence the real marginal cost, is determined by the disutility of labor supply, which
explains why consumption and government expenditures have an identical impact on
marginal cost and on ination, which is conrmed by   = 0.
The consumption Euler equation remains unchanged from the previous section:
ct =   1
Y=C
(it   t+1   rnt ) + ct+1, (20)
22
where the natural real interest rate also remains specied as before, by (7).
Government expenditures are valued by consumers. More specically, their utility
function is additively separable between private consumption, government expenditures
and labor supply. Let G denote the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
of government expenditures. Assuming that the steady state level of government expen-
ditures G is chosen optimally, the second-order approximation to the utility function of
consumers around the steady state yields the following loss function:
1X
t=1
t
h
[t   !t 1]2 + 

[ct + (1   )gt]2 + 

g2t
i
, (21)
where the parameter  is dened as:
 =  

1    + GY=G
Y=C

. (22)
There are two reasons why government expenditures appear in the loss function: it is
valued by consumers and it a¤ects labor supply.24
The equilibrium of the exible price economy coincides with the rst-best allocation
of resources. Hence, the exible price multiplier   gives the e¢ cient response of output
to an increase in government expenditures. But, as Ct = Yt  Gt, if Gt increases by one
unit, then Ct should ideally increase by     1 units, i.e. it should fall by 1     units.
Thus, as can be seen from the loss function, the optimal deviation of consumption from
its natural level following a scal shock is given by ct =  (1   )gt.25 The Phillips curve
(18) implies that this e¢ cient response of consumption is consistent with an optimal rate
of disination, where t = !t 1.
The optimal monetary policy is obtained by minimizing the loss function (21) with
respect to the nominal interest rate it and to government spending gt subject to the
Phillips curve (18) with 0 given, to the Euler equation (20) and to it  0. The rst-best
allocation is characterized by t = !t 1 and ct = gt = 0. Without the zero lower bound,
this allocation can always be implemented by setting it = t+1 + rnt = !
t+10 + r
n
t for all
t  1. Finally, note that the model of the previous section is a special case of this model
with gt = 0 for all t.
24If G = 0, consumers do not care about deviations away from the steady state level of government
expenditures, which is set at the optimum of the exible price economy. In that case, gt only enters the
loss function because of its e¤ect on labor supply.
25The natural level was dened as the consumption level that prevails in a exible price economy in
the absence of government intervention. Hence, the natural level is not a¤ected by scal shocks.
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3.2 Calibration
I rely on exactly the same calibration as in the previous section, which implies that
  = 0:263. The only new deep parameter is G, which is set equal to . Hence, G = 1.
This implies  = 1:247.
3.3 Pump Priming the Economy
Before characterizing the optimal policy, I briey consider an insightful benchmark where
scal policy can be used in period 1 only, i.e. gt = 0 for all t  2. In particular, I
show that, thanks to ination persistence, the scal policy implemented at time 1 can
permanently move the economy into a rst-best allocation.
If the economy is in a rst-best allocation from time 2 onwards, we must have: ct =
gt = 0, t = !t 1 = !t 11 and it = t+1 + rnt = !
t1 + r
n
t  0 for all t  2.
Crucially, the ination rate 1 must be high enough to guarantee that the zero lower
bound will not be binding at 2 or thereafter. As !  1, !t is non-increasing over time
and, hence, a su¢ cient condition for the zero lower bound to be non-binding after time
2 is iT = !T1 + r  0. Thus, the smallest rate of ination at time 1 consistent with the
implementation of the rst-best allocation is:
1 =
 r
!T
. (23)
The equilibrium of the economy at time 1 is implicitly characterized by:
1   !0 =  [c1 + (1   ) g1] , (24)
c1 =   1
Y=C
(i1   !1   r) . (25)
I impose the mild condition ! < (Y=C)=, which ensures that, on its own, monetary
policy at time 1 cannot generate ination. Thus, with 0  0, the optimal monetary
policy at 1 is to set i1 = 0.26 The magnitude of the scal stimulus g1 necessary to escape
the liquidity trap is obtained by substituting (23) and (25) with i1 = 0 into (24). This
yields:
g1 =
1
(1   )
 r
!T

1  !
Y=C
 
1  !T 1  !0 > 0. (26)
This proves by construction that scal policy can, within one period, allow the economy
to reach a rst-best allocation.
While this policy is clearly unlikely to be optimal, it shows that ination persistence
considerably enhances the ability of scal policy to lift the economy out of a liquidity
26In fact, even if 0 is positive, but not too high, then the optimal monetary policy is still characterized
by i1 = 0.
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trap. A front-loaded stimulus gets ination started. This reduces the real interest rate,
which brings it closer, or even equal, to its natural counterpart.
Thus, with ination persistence, scal policy can "pump prime" the economy by
generating a su¢ cient amount of ination. Importantly, the e¢ cacy of this policy does
not rely on the forward looking behavior of agents.
Of course, the scal stimulus and the required rate of ination are very large, unless
! is close to 1. Under the chosen calibration of the model, if ! = 1, then ination at
time 1 needs to rise to 0:005, i.e. 2% per year. This requires a scal stimulus g1 equal
to 0:034, i.e. 3.4% of the quarterly steady state level of GDP. However, if ! = 0:841,
then ination needs to rise to 0:16, i.e. 64% per year, which requires a stimulus equal to
0:935, i.e. 93.4% of quarterly GDP. The output gap equivalent social welfare loss from
this policy is equal to 1.23% when ! = 1 and to 36.90% when ! = 0:841.27
3.4 Opportunistic vs. Stimulus Spending
Following Werning (2012), I shall decompose government expenditures into two com-
ponents: opportunistic spending and stimulus spending. More formally, opportunistic
spending at time t is dened as:
gt = argmax
gt
[ct + (1   )gt]2 + g2t . (27)
It therefore corresponds to level of spending that the government would like to have,
ignoring all dynamic general equilibrium e¤ects. Solving (27) yields:
gt =  
1   
(1   )2 +  ct, (28)
which, under the chosen calibration, gives gt =  0:41ct. In a depressed economy, the
demand for consumption is low, which induces rms to reduce their demand for labor.
This lowers the equilibrium wage rate, which reduces the cost of government expenditures.
Hence, opportunistic spending is always countercyclical.28 The other component, stimulus
spending, is dened as the residual:
g^t = gt   gt . (29)
It corresponds to the spending induced by dynamic general equilibrium considerations,
which are realized to stimulate the economy.
27The output gap equivalent social welfare loss in the presence of scal policy is formally dened below,
by equation (30). It is a straightforward generalization from the previous section.
28This insight would naturally extend to a model that does allow for unemployment, as the high rates
of unemployment that are typical of recessions reduce the opportunity cost of government spending.
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3.5 Fiscal Policy without Ination Persistence
To begin the analysis of optimal monetary and scal policy in a liquidity trap, I consider
the benchmark case without ination persistence, where ! = 0.29 As shown by Werning
(2012), under full commitment, the optimal scal policy is to have no stimulus spending
whenever Y=C = 1. In that case, the burden of stabilizing the economy exclusively
relies on monetary policy, while scal policy only consists of countercyclical opportunistic
government spending.
The proposed calibration implies that Y=C = 7:5 > 1. Figure 6 displays the
corresponding optimal scal policy when it is jointly determined with monetary policy
under full commitment. Qualitatively, the other two endogenous variables of the economy,
i.e. t and it, behave almost exactly as in Figure 1 and are therefore not reported. Figure 6
shows that the stimulus component of government spending is as strongly countercyclical
as the opportunistic component.
By committing to keep the nominal interest rate equal to zero for some time after
the crisis is over, the central bank generates an output boom towards the end of the
crisis. When the elasticity of substitution across goods  is high enough to ensure that
Y=C > 1, then the government cares much more about price dispersion t   !t 1
than about the output gap ct + (1    )gt or about uctuations in government spending
gt, as can be seen from the loss function (21). Then, the optimal scal policy is to
implement a strongly countercyclical stimulus component of government spending, such
as to increase the magnitude of the consumption boom. Indeed, a low level of government
spending reduces the output gap ct+ (1  )gt, which allows the central bank to keep its
nominal rate equal to zero for slightly longer after the crisis is over such as to enhance
the magnitude of the consumption boom.30 A larger boom implies that, in the midst of
the crisis, slightly less ination is required to stabilize the economy, i.e. the economy can
cope with a slightly higher real interest rate.
Interestingly, if we discount the future at rate , the present value of government
expenditures induced by the crisis is equal to zero, i.e.
P1
t=1 
tgt = 0. As we shall see in
the next subsection, this is a general result under full commitment that also applies with
ination persistence.
While government expenditures are only used to ne-tune the optimal policy under
full commitment, it is solely responsible for stabilizing the economy when the government
cannot commit beyond time T . Figure 7 displays the equilibrium allocation under the
optimal monetary and scal policy with commitment up to time T .
29The resolution of the optimal monetary and scal policy problem is outlined in appendix B.
30In Figure 1, without scal policy, the nominal interest rate remains equal to zero for three quarters
after the crisis is over. Under the jointly optimal monetary and scal policy, the nominal rate remains
at the zero lower bound for four quarters and rises slightly more slowly afterwards.
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Figure 6: Optimal monetary and scal policy with full commitment when ! = 0
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Figure 7: Optimal monetary and scal policy with commitment up to T when ! = 0
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Clearly, throughout the crisis, the optimal monetary policy is to be as accommodative
as possible and, hence, to set the nominal interest rate equal to zero. Without commit-
ment beyond time T , the economy is in a rst-best allocation as soon as the crisis is over,
with ct = t = gt = 0 and it = rnt = r for all t  T + 1.
Note that Werning (2012) considers a di¤erent problem where scal and monetary
policy are characterized by di¤erent degrees of commitment. In particular, he considers
the case where scal authorities can commit up to time T , or even beyond, while monetary
policy cannot commit at all. As a result, any ination generated by scal policy is
immediately killed o¤ by the central bank through a rise in the nominal rate. Such
a low degree of coordination between monetary and scal policy in crisis time seems
implausible. By contrast, I assume that monetary and scal policy are jointly determined
with commitment up to T . Hence, the central bank can commit not to raise its interest
rate throughout the duration of the crisis. This enhances the scope of scal policy.31
Figure 8 displays the decomposition of the optimal path of government expenditures.
It shows that stimulus spending account for nearly 70% of the optimal scal policy. The
bulk of this stimulus is concentrated towards the very end of the crisis, with a peak at
time T . This creates a boom in the output gap ct + (1    )gt at the end of the crisis,
driven by high government expenditures gt rather than by high consumption ct. The
expectation of this boom generates ination. This reduces the real interest rate, which
stabilizes the demand for consumption. This scal policy breaks the deationary spiral
shown in Figure 2 that would occur with monetary policy alone.
If we had Y=C = 1, then stimulus spending would be virtually equal to zero over
the rst half of the crisis. However, with Y=C = 7:5 > 1, the government is willing to
tolerate larger uctuations in the output gap and in government expenditures in order
to reduce uctuations in inations. Hence, compared to the case where Y=C = 1, it
implements a stimulus program which is slightly less inationary at the end of the crisis.
This needs to be compensated with more government spending throughout the crisis and
especially towards the beginning when the output boom at the end of the crisis is only a
distant prospect.
It is interesting to note that the optimal timing of government expenditures under
rational expectations and without ination persistence is very di¤erent from the one
typically adopted by governments in crisis time. In practice, most stimulus e¤orts are
concentrated at the beginning of crises. A typical concern of governments is that many
31In this paper, I do not consider cases where monetary and scal policy are characterized by di¤erent
degrees of commitment. Ination persistence makes the model both forward and backward looking.
Moreover, the deterministic length of the crisis makes the model non-stationary. Thus, solving for the
optimal monetary policy without commitment is numerically demanding. Solving for the optimal scal
policy with commitment taking into account the discretionary response of monetary policy is therefore
beyond the scope of this paper. Similarly, I do not solve for the optimal monetary policy with commitment
together the optimal scal policy without commitment.
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Figure 8: Optimal monetary and scal policy with commitment up to T when ! = 0
possible expenditures, such as infrastructure investments, cannot be realized su¢ ciently
rapidly. They are therefore not included in stimulus packages, even though they would
o¤er a perfect commitment device to spend in the future.
But, in a model that is purely forward looking, past stimulus spending has no impact
whatsoever on the current level of economic activity. Governments must therefore believe
that initial spending has a persistent stabilizing impact on the economy. To capture this,
we need to add a backward looking component into the new Keynesian model; and the
most natural way of doing so is to allow for ination persistence.
3.6 Fiscal Policy with Ination Persistence
Let us now investigate the joint determination of monetary and scal policy in the pres-
ence of ination persistence. I begin by analyzing the benchmark case of full indexation,
where ! = 1. Figure 9 displays the optimal scal policy under full commitment. The
other two endogenous variables of the model, i.e. t and it, behave almost exactly as in
Figure 3 and are therefore not reported. The only di¤erence is that the nominal interest
rate starts rising two quarters later than in Figure 3 and by a slightly smaller amount,
which is not surprising since scal policy now contributes to stabilizing the economy.
With ination persistence, the stimulus component of government spending is front-
loaded. The aim is to create a positive output gap ct + (1   )gt such as to get ination
started. After the fth quarter, the stimulus component becomes slightly negative in
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Figure 9: Optimal monetary and scal policy with full commitment when ! = 1
order to eliminate the positive output gap, such as to stabilize ination to its new higher
level. Interestingly, if the nominal interest rate was constrained to be equal to zero
throughout the crisis, the optimal scal policy would be virtually unchanged and social
welfare would hardly decrease. This shows that governments can rely on scal policy
alone to stabilize the economy when ! = 1.
Note that the economy reaches a rst-best allocation before time T . Hence, commit-
ment beyond T is useless and the optimal monetary and scal policy with commitment
up to T remains unchanged.
While the full indexation benchmark is insightful, it is more realistic to assume partial
indexation of prices to ination. Figure 10 displays the optimal scal policy when ! =
0:51=4 ' 0:841, which is jointly determined with monetary policy under full commitment.
Again, the paths of ination and of the nominal interest rate are almost unchanged from
Figure 4 and are therefore not reported.
The optimal scal policy under partial indexation and full commitment is a combina-
tion of the policy with full indexation and with no persistence. The stimulus component
is positive at the beginning of the crisis, in order to spur ination, as under full indexa-
tion; and it is negative around the end of the crisis, in order to induce an adjustment in
monetary policy that strengthens the consumption boom,32 as in the absence of ination
persistence.
32Recall that consumption is determined by the Euler equation (20) and is therefore not directly
a¤ected by the level of government expenditures.
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Figure 10: Optimal monetary and scal policy with full commitment when ! = 0:841
If the scal authority can fully commit, then, with a discount rate equal to , the
present value of government expenditures induced by the optimal scal policy is always
equal to zero, i.e.
P1
t=1 
tgt = 0. This can easily be shown by combining the rst-order
conditions to the optimal policy problem.33 This results holds even if the central bank
commits to a path of nominal interest rates that is not optimal. It follows that, under full
commitment, the scal policy debate should focus entirely on the timing of government
expenditures, not on its average level.
Finally, Figure 11 displays the optimal allocation under partial indexation, with ! =
0:841, when monetary and scal authorities can only commit up to time T . While
monetary policy alone can stabilize the economy in that case, as shown by Figure 5, it
turns out not to play any role in the presence of scal policy. Indeed, the optimal policy
is for the central bank to commit to set the nominal interest rate equal to zero throughout
the crisis.
The optimal scal policy is both front-loaded and back-loaded. Its decomposition is
shown in Figure 12, which reveals that, again, the optimal policy under partial commit-
ment is a combination of the policy with full indexation and with no persistence. The
33It is obtained by combining equations (B4) and (B5) from appendix B, which are the rst-order
conditions with respect to ct and gt, respectively. More precisely, equation (B4) for each time t must
be multiplied by t. All these equations must then be added for t running from 1 to innity. All the
ts for t  1 cancel out, while we know that 0 = 0. Equation (B5) should then be used to replace
ct + (1   )gt   t by  =(1   )gt. The resulting sum can then be factorized and simplied to deliver
the desired result.
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Figure 11: Optimal monetary and scal policy with commitment up to T when ! = 0:841
stimulus component is positive both at the beginning of the crisis, in order to get ination
going, and especially at the end, in order to create an output boom, the expectation of
which is inationary.34 Under partial commitment, the stimulus component is by far the
main driver of scal policy, accounting for more than two thirds of the deviation from
the steady state level of government expenditures.
While the shape of the optimal scal policy under partial indexation (Figure 12) is
broadly similar to that with no persistence (Figure 8), the magnitude of the required
stimulus is much smaller in the former case. This shows that ination persistence makes
it considerably easier for scal policy to stabilize the economy.
3.7 Welfare Analysis
I now turn to the welfare analysis in order to quantify the e¤ectiveness of scal policy.
Table 3 reports the output gap equivalent social welfare loss from imperfect stabilization
under an optimal monetary and scal policy. As in the previous section, the output gap
equivalent social welfare loss c is implicitly dened by:
1X
t=1
t
h
[t   !t 1]2 + 

[ct + (1   )gt]2 + 

g2t
i
=
TX
t=1
t


c2. (30)
34Note that, even when Y=C = 1, the stimulus component is still positive (but of a smaller magni-
tude) at the beginning of the crisis, which would not be the case without ination persistence.
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Figure 12: Optimal monetary and scal policy with commitment up to T when ! = 0:841
Comparing Table 1 and 3 reveals that scal policy is particularly valuable when ination
persistence is low and when the government cannot commit beyond time T . The gains
generated by scal policy are relatively small under full commitment or under partial
commitment when ! = 1, in which case commitment beyond time T is useless. When
! = 0:841, under partial commitment, scal policy alone35 yields a welfare loss of 0.56%
and is therefore signicantly more e¢ cient than monetary policy alone, which yields a
welfare loss of 0.71%.
! = 0 ! = 0:841 ! = 1
Full commitment 1.89% 0.51% 0.30%
Commitment up to time T 2.57% 0.56% 0.30%
Table 3: Output gap equivalent social welfare loss from imperfect stabilization under
optimal monetary and scal policy
35Recall that, under partial commitment and with ! = 0:841, the optimal monetary policy is to commit
to a zero nominal interest rate throughout the crisis.
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4 Monetary and Fiscal Policy with Adaptive Expec-
tations
So far, I have assumed that ination persistence was due to price indexation, through the
parameter !. However, ination persistence can instead be caused by backward looking
expectations. Indeed, Milani (2007) estimates ! = 0:885 under rational expectations,
but ! = 0:032 under adaptive learning.
In this section, I therefore set ! = 0 and assume that agents form adaptive expecta-
tions throughout the duration of the crisis. The rational expectation hypothesis is indeed
very demanding in crisis time. Even in the absence of uncertainty, agents need to have a
high degree of sophistication in order to be able to work out the whole future trajectory
of ination. They need to think recursively from the end of the crisis, or even beyond, to
the present time.36 Thus, adaptive expectations seems to provide a sensible alternative
benchmark.
I assume that, once the crisis is over, agents revert to rational expectations. This
implies that, from time T +1 onwards, the economy will be in a rst-best allocation with
no ination and no output gap, i.e. t = 0 and ct + (1    )gt = 0 for all t  T + 1.
Forming rational expectations of future ination is admittedly much simpler in normal
times than in exceptional circumstances when the zero lower bound is binding. It is much
easier to predict perfect stabilization after the crisis is over than to gure out the whole
trajectory of ination during the crisis. Also, the assumption of rational expectations
from T + 1 onwards simplies the analysis as, otherwise, ination persistence due to
backward looking expectations would create a trade-o¤ between ination and output
stabilization after the crisis is over.
For simplicity, I assume that the government cannot commit beyond time T . Hence,
the scal authority will choose to set gt = 0 for all t  T + 1.
Let ~Et 1 denote the expectations formed by agents based on t 1 information. Agents
know that ination will be in steady state, normalized to zero, after the crisis. Thus,
~Et 1 [t+k] = 0 for all k  T + 1  t. Expectations of ination in crisis time are adaptive
and are therefore based on both the last observed rate of ination and the steady state
rate of ination, normalized to zero. We therefore have:
~Et 1 [t] = t 1 + (1  )0, (31)
36As a result, under rational expectations, the current level of ination and output are very sensitive
to the monetary policy implemented in a distant future. For instance, consider the optimal monetary
policy with commitment up to T and with ! = 0:841. Assume that the central bank commits to the
path of nominal interest rates displayed in Figure 5, expect in the 18th quarter where the nominal rate
is set equal to 0.1%, i.e. 0.4% per year, instead of 0%. This small change completely destabilizes the
economy and results in a current output gap equal to -25.76%, instead of -0.36%, and a current rate of
ination of -8.82%, instead of 0.06%.
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where  2 [0; 1] is a parameter capturing the inuence of current ination on future
forecasts. Thus, 1    corresponds to the extent to which ination expectations are
well anchored at the steady state rate of ination. Iterating on adaptive expectations
immediately yields:
~Et 1 [t+k] = k+1t 1, (32)
for any k  T   t.
Households choose their demand for consumption such as to maximize their expected
intertemporal utility. The solution to the household problem at time t is characterized
by a set of Euler equations, which can be log-linearized to yield:
~Et 1 [ct+k] =   1
Y=C

it+k   ~Et 1 [t+k+1]  rnt+k

+ ~Et 1 [ct+k+1] , (33)
where both the paths of the natural real interest rate rnt and of the nominal rate it
until T are exogenous and publicly known. As households rely on backward looking
expectations, their consumption plans made at the beginning of time t is based on the
information available at the end of t   1. Thus, households are unable to foresee the
impact of their demand at time t on the aggregate price level, and on ination, at t.
This limited understanding of general equilibrium e¤ects seems plausible in the absence
of rational expectations.
Households know that, as soon as the crisis is over, the output gap will be reduced to
zero and government spending will be at its steady state level. Thus, ~Et 1 [ct+k] = 0 for
all k  T + 1  t. Combining Euler equations for di¤erent values of k together with the
fact that ~Et 1 [cT+1] = 0 yields:
~Et 1 [ct+k] =   1
Y=C
T tX
l=k

it+l   ~Et 1 [t+l+1]  rnt+l

, (34)
for k  T   t. Note that, the actual demand ct for consumption at t is decided at the
beginning of time t based on t  1 information, which implies that ct = ~Et 1 [ct]. Hence,
using the expectation rule (32) for k  T   t and ~Et 1 [T+1] = 0 yields, after some
simplications:
ct =   1
Y=C
T tX
l=0
(it+l   r) + 
2
Y=C
1  T t
1   t 1, (35)
where I have used the fact that rnt+l = r < 0 for all l  T   t.
Ination in the new Keynesian framework is fundamentally determined by the price
setting behavior of monopolistically competitive rms. Using the denition of the aggre-
gate price index and the link between the real marginal cost of production and the output
gap, the log-linearized rst-order condition to rmsoptimal price setting problem can
35
be directly expressed as a function of ination and of the output gap. This yields:37
t = ~Et 1
" 1X
k=0
()k [ (ct+k + (1   )gt+k) + (1  )t+k]
#
. (36)
When re-optimizing their own price, rms care about their future nominal marginal costs.
This is why they need to form expectations of future output gaps, which determine real
marginal costs, and of future ination; both of which appear on right hand side of (36).
To determine their new price at t, rms rely on information available at the end of
time t 1. Thus, they do not realize that the ination rate at t is determined, through the
price index, by the newly reset price that they themselves, together with symmetric rms,
choose to set. By making expectations at t conditional on t   1 information, I assume
that neither households nor rms fully understand contemporaneous general equilibrium
e¤ects, which seems plausible in the absence of rational expectations.38 Note that, at
any point in time, households and rms are forming the same expectations, which is
consistent with the evidence reported by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2014).
Substituting (34) for k  T   t and ~Et 1 [ct+k] = 0 for k  T + 1   t into (36) and
using the expectation rule (32) for k  T   t and ~Et 1 [t+k] = 0 for k  T +1  t yields,
after some simplications:
t =   
Y=C
T tX
k=0
1  ()k+1
1   (it+k   r) + (1   )
T tX
k=0
()k gt+k (37)
+
"
(1  )1  ()
T+1 t
1   +

Y=C
T 1 tX
k=0
1  ()k+1
1   
k+2
#
t 1,
for all t  T , where I have used the fact that rnt+k = r < 0 for all k  T   t. This
expression clearly shows that adaptive expectations at time t based on t  1 information
is a source of ination persistence provided that  > 0.
The government needs to choose the paths of nominal interest rates it and of govern-
ment expenditures gt that minimize the loss function:
1X
t=1
t
h
t
2 +


[ct + (1   )gt]2 + 

g2t
i
, (38)
37Taking expectations with respect to t, instead of t   1, and using the law of iterated expectations,
which does not hold under adaptive expectations, this expression immediately simplies to the new
Keynesian Phillips curve (18) with ! = 0.
38This assumption can however easily be relaxed by taking expectations everywhere conditional on t,
instead of t  1. In that case, it is possible for a rise in the nominal rate to generate some ination. The
mechanism is even more straightforward than under rational expectations since, here, higher current
ination mechanically raises ination expectations, as ~Et [t+k] = kt. This can reduce future real
interest rates, which can raise current ination. Note that, while potentially interesting to investigate,
this case does not display any ination persistence.
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subject to equation (35), giving the actual consumption level at t, and to equation (37)
together with a given initial rate of ination 0, describing the ination dynamics. This
loss function implies that the ideal rate of ination is always equal to zero. Indeed, in the
absence of price indexation, any non-zero ination generates relative price distortions.
Let us set the initial rate of ination equal to zero, i.e. 0 = 0. In that case, without
the zero lower bound, the optimal policy would trivially be to set the nominal interest
rate it equal to the natural real rate rnt and to leave government spending constant at its
steady state level. This would implement the rst-best allocation. But, of course, with a
negative natural real interest rate, this policy violates the zero lower bound.
Equation (37) together with the zero lower bound implies that, in the absence of scal
policy, if t 1  0, then t < 0. Thus, with 0 = 0, deation and a depressed consumption
level are unavoidable throughout the crisis. In that context, the best that the central bank
can do, with or without commitment, is to be as accommodative as possible by setting
the nominal rate equal to zero throughout. This conrms the traditional view of the
liquidity trap that, under backward looking expectations, monetary policy is ine¤ective.
Thus, without rational forward looking behavior, ination persistence is not su¢ cient to
allow the central bank to stabilize the economy during a liquidity trap episode. Hence,
under adaptive expectations, scal policy o¤ers the only hope for economic stabilization.
The optimal scal policy can be characterized numerically. For the simulation, I
set  = 0:51=4 ' 0:841, which implies that the expectation at the end of time t   1 of
ination in one year is equal to half the current rate of ination, i.e. ~Et 1 [t+3] = 0:5t 1.
Simulations conrm that it is optimal to set the nominal interest rate equal to zero
throughout the crisis and to rely on scal policy alone to stabilize the economy. Figure 13
displays the optimal allocation. It also shows the decomposition of government spending
between the opportunistic and the stimulus component, which are dened as in the
previous section.
A striking result is the huge magnitude of the optimal scal stimulus, which in the rst
few quarters of the crisis exceeds 10% of quarterly steady state GDP.39 Under rational
expectations, a scal stimulus creates ination expectations, which considerably enhances
the e¢ cacy of the stimulus program. Under adaptive expectations, however, scal policy
cannot create ination expectations, which must be compensated by a larger magnitude
of government expenditures.
The scal stimulus serves two purposes. First, as can be seen in (37), it raises in-
ation, which prevents the economy from falling into deation, which would generate
relative price distortions. Second, higher ination raises consumption, by (35). While
consumption does not seem fully stabilized, recall that what matters for social welfare is
the output gap dened as ct + (1    )gt. Figure 14 displays both the output gap and
39Recall the denition of gt given by (17).
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Figure 13: Optimal scal policy under adaptive expectations when  = 0:841
ination. It shows that, at the optimum, uctuations in the output gap are rather small.
Ination is, on average, slightly positive, but close to zero. It might therefore seem
surprising that the optimal policy does not raise ination by more. This has two ex-
planations. First, a zero rate of ination minimizes the relative price distortions, which
weights heavily in the loss function. Second, ination can only have a limited impact on
expected future real interest rates. Indeed, at any time t, agents expect the real interest
rate at time t+ k, with t+ k  T   1, to be equal to it+k   ~Et 1 [t+k+1] = 0  k+2t 1,
which is close to zero unless k is very small or  is very close to 1.
Finally, Figure 13 shows that the optimal scal policy is heavily front-loaded, which
is mostly due to the stimulus component of government spending. To understand this
pattern, note that, by (34), consumption is equal to the sum of future gaps between the
expected real interest rate and its natural counterpart. But, as we have just seen, the
expected future real interest rates are close to zero. Thus, at the beginning of the crisis,
the sum of future natural real rates is large, which results in the current and expected
future levels of consumption to be very depressed. By (36), ination is inuenced by the
expected level of future output gaps, dened as ct + (1   )gt. To avoid sharp deation,
the government needs to compensate the low levels of consumption by spending a lot.
Towards the end of the crisis, the remaining horizon is much shorter, hence agents only
expect consumption to be slightly negative. This only needs to be o¤set by a small
amount of government spending. In sum, a large and front-loaded stimulus is required
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Figure 14: Output gap ct + (1   )gt and ination under the optimal policy when  = 0:841
to keep ination close to zero throughout the crisis, which turns out to characterize the
optimal policy when  = 0:841.
Table 4 displays the welfare implications of the optimal stabilization policy. The
rst line reports the welfare loss in the absence of scal policy and with the nominal
interest rate set equal to zero throughout the crisis. Clearly, a larger value of  implies
a stronger degree of persistence and, hence, a stronger deationary spiral. The e¤ect is
so strong that, for large values of , the log-linearized model does not permit a precise
quantication of the welfare loss from imperfect stabilization. Fiscal policy is essential
to stabilize the economy.
 = 0  = 0:841  = 1
No scal policy 10.12% 3574.87% 1.97109%
Optimal scal policy 5.83% 7.14% 6.13%
Table 4: Output gap equivalent social welfare loss from imperfect stabilization under
adaptive expectations
It might seem surprising that, under the optimal scal policy, the welfare loss is
larger for an intermediate value of  than for extreme values. When  = 0, expectations
of future ination are always equal to zero, i.e. expectations are perfectly anchored.
Hence, consumption is independent of the last realization of ination. It can therefore
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not be a¤ected by scal policy. The real interest rate is nevertheless above the natural
rate. Thus, consumption is negative, which generates deation. The optimal scal policy
only helps to raise ination in order to reduce relative price distortions. However, at
the optimum, ination during the crisis does not need be raised all the way to zero.
Government spending, i.e. the last term in the loss function (38), accounts for 65:8% of
the welfare loss from imperfect stabilization, while deation accounts for 25:4%.
When  = 0:841, ination needs to be set close to zero to avoid the deationary
spiral. This requires a larger scal stimulus. In that case, government spending accounts
for 98:0% of the welfare loss. Using equation (37), it is possible to solve for the scal
policy that results in an ination rate exactly equal to zero throughout the crisis. This
policy generates an output gap equivalent social welfare loss of 7:24%, only 0:10% higher
than under the optimal policy. This suggests that ination targeting might be a good
guide to scal policy in crisis time.
Finally, when  = 1, the last realization of ination t 1 does have a persistent
impact on the expectations of future ination and, hence, on the expectation of future
real interest rates it+k   ~Et 1 [t+k+1] = 0  k+2t 1 =  t 1. In that case, the optimal
policy is to bring the ination rate close to  r > 0, such that the real rate becomes
almost equal to the natural real rate. Thus, the optimal scal stimulus is even larger
at the beginning of the crisis, reaching 14:2% of quarterly steady state GDP in the rst
quarter of the crisis. This generates enough ination to "pump prime" the economy. The
optimal stimulus then drops to 4:7% after a year (5th quarter) and to 1:8% after two years
(9th quarter) and even less afterwards.40 Thus, the overall size of the optimal stimulus
program is smaller than when  = 0:841, which is why welfare is higher. Government
expenditures are, however, even more heavily front-loaded. When  = 1, government
spending account for 91:6% of the welfare loss from imperfect stabilization.
It has been assumed throughout this section that the government commits to a given
path of expenditures. Thus, as can be seen from (37), future expenditures a¤ect both the
current and future rates of ination. This e¤ect favors back-loaded stimulus programs.
An alternative would be to assume that boundedly rational agents always expect future
expenditures to be at their steady state level. Thus, in (37), (1    )PT tk=0 ()k gt+k
should be replaced by (1    )gt. In that case, the optimal scal policy is even more
front loaded. Moreover, if  is too small to "pump prime" the economy, i.e. to raise
expectations of future ination, then the size of the optimal stimulus package is even
larger. This is not surprising since future expenditures no longer contribute to raising
the current rate of ination.
40The main reasons why the stimulus does not drop faster is that ination at time 1 is strongly
inuenced by government spending occurring shortly after, as can be seen from (37). But, from the loss
function (38), the welfare cost is convex in the level of government expenditures. Thus, it is desirable to
smooth the stimulus over several periods at the beginning of the crisis.
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5 Conclusion
This analysis has shown that ination persistence has major consequences for the optimal
conduct of monetary and scal policy in a liquidity trap. If the Phillips curve is both
forward and backward looking, then the monetary policy that is implemented during a
liquidity trap episode can be e¤ective and can be used to avoid a depression. The central
bank does not need to be able to commit beyond the end of the crisis in order to get some
traction on the economy. Regarding scal policy, the forward looking component of the
Phillips curve makes it desirable to back-load government expenditures, while the back-
ward looking component justies a front-loading of expenditures. Importantly, ination
persistence considerably reduces the magnitude of the scal stimulus that is necessary to
lift the economy out of depression. These results show that ination persistence, which
is usually perceived as a curse, is in fact a blessing in a liquidity trap.
Finally, while I have realized most of my analysis in a rational expectation framework,
I have also considered the possibility that ination persistence could result from adaptive
expectations. In that case, the absence of forward looking behavior makes monetary
policy totally ine¤ective. The government therefore needs to implement a scal stimulus
that is large and heavily front-loaded.
An alternative scenario, which for conciseness has not be fully explored, is that a frac-
tion of agents form rational expectations while the remaining fraction relies on adaptive
expectations. In that case, the Phillips curve is both forward and backward looking, which
should make the monetary policy implemented during the crisis potentially e¤ective.
The steady state rate of ination and the structural degree of ination persistence have
both been assumed to be exogenous and constant throughout this analysis. However, the
extent to which ination expectations are anchored at the o¢ cial target rate of ination
is inuenced by past realizations of ination, which is a source of ination persistence.
Monetary and scal policy can therefore potentially be used to anchor, or to de-anchor,
ination expectations. For instance, the Japanese government has recently chosen to rely
on expansionary monetary policy in order to reach a higher ination target. Analyzing
monetary and scal policy with endogenous ination trend and persistence should be a
promising avenue for future research.
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A Solving the Optimal Monetary Policy Problem
A.1 Full Commitment
The optimal monetary policy problem with full commitment consists in minimizing the
loss function (6) subject to the new Keynesian Phillips curve (2) with 0 given, to the
Euler equation (4) and to the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate (5). The
Lagrangian corresponding to the problem is:
L =
1X
t=1
t
h
(t   !t 1)2 + 

c2t + t ((1 + !)t   !t 1   t+1   ct) (A1)
+t

ct +
1
Y=C
(it   t+1   rnt )  ct+1

,
where t and t are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the new Keynesian Phillips
curve and the Euler equation, respectively. The rst-order conditions with respect to it,
t and ct are respectively given by:
t  0 and it  0 with complementary slackness (A2)
t   !t 1 + t   t 1 = !

t   !t 1 + t+1   t

+
t 1
Y=C
(A3)


ct   t + t  
t 1

= 0 (A4)
for all t  1 and with 0 = 0 = 0.
From T+1 onwards, the environment is stationary. I therefore focus on solutions such
that the optimal allocation converges to a steady state where the zero lower bound is no
longer binding. This implies, from (A2), that 1 = 0. Hence, from (A3), 1(1 !) = 0;
from (4), i1 = 1 + r; from (2), c1 = 0; and, from (A4), 1 = 0.
To solve the problem numerically, I consider a nite horizon of length N , with N >>
T . The solution to the optimal policy problem is fully characterized by the new Keynesian
Phillips curve (2) with 0 given, the Euler equation (4), the three rst-order conditions
(A2), (A3) and (A4) together with two boundary conditions N+1 = 0 and N+1 =
!N . These conditions guarantee that the economy is in a rst-best allocation from
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N + 1 onwards. This yields a system of 5N equations in 5N unknowns, which are
fit; t; ct; t; tgNt=1.
One technical di¢ culty, due to the complementary slackness condition (A2), is that we
do not know the pattern of binding zero lower bound constraints on the nominal interest
rate. The solution is to guess a given pattern, to solve the problem, which yields the
corresponding values ftgNt=1, and to update the guess by considering that the zero lower
bound on it is binding if and only if the computed value of t is positive. We can then
iterate until we obtain a guess that only yields non-negative values of t. It is possible
to check that, starting from a di¤erent initial guess, the algorithm converges to the same
solution.
A.2 Partial Commitment
Let us now solve the optimal monetary policy problem when the central bank can only
commit up to time T . When determining its monetary policy from time 1 to T , the
central bank anticipates that it will choose to implement the rst-best allocation from
T + 1 onwards. Thus, under partial commitment, the central bank takes T+1 = !T as
an additional constraint. The Lagrangian is:
L =
TX
t=1
t
h
(t   !t 1)2 + 

c2t + t ((1 + !)t   !t 1   t+1   ct) (A5)
+t

ct +
1
Y=C
(it   t+1   rnt )  ct+1

+ T & (T+1   !T ) ,
where & is the multiplier associated with the new constraint. The rst-order conditions
are still given by (A2), (A3) and (A4) for all t 2 f1; 2; :::; Tg, except for (A3) with t = T
which is replaced by:
T   !T 1 + T   T 1 =
!
Y=C
T +
T 1
Y=C
. (A6)
These rst-order conditions together with the new Keynesian Phillips curve (2) and the
Euler equation (4) for t 2 f1; 2; :::; Tg and the boundary condition T+1 = !T fully
characterize the solution to the optimal monetary policy problem with commitment up
to time T . The pattern of binding zero lower bounds is found numerically following the
procedure described in the previous subsection.41
41Figure 5 provides an example where the pattern of binding zero lower bounds is non-monotone.
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B Solving the Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy
Problem
The Lagrangian corresponding to the optimal monetary and scal policy problem under
full commitment is:
L =
1X
t=1
t
h
(t   !t 1)2 + 

(ct + (1   )gt)2 + 

g2t (B1)
+t ((1 + !)t   !t 1   t+1    (ct + (1   )gt))
+t

ct +
1
Y=C
(it   t+1   rnt )  ct+1

.
The rst-order conditions with respect to it, t, ct and gt are respectively given by:
t  0 and it  0 with complementary slackness (B2)
t   !t 1 + t   t 1 = !

t   !t 1 + t+1   t

+
t 1
Y=C
(B3)


[ct + (1   )gt]  t + t  
t 1

= 0 (B4)
(1   )

[ct + (1   )gt] + 

gt   (1   )t = 0 (B5)
for all t  1 and with 0 = 0 = 0.42
Under commitment up to time T , the rst-order conditions are still given by (B2),
(B3), (B4) and (B5) for all t 2 f1; 2; :::; Tg, except for (B3) with t = T which is replaced
by:
T   !T 1 + T   T 1 =
!
Y=C
T +
T 1
Y=C
. (B6)
42Note that, using (B4), the rst-order condition with respect to gt, (B5), can be rewritten as
(=) gt = (1    ) [t   t 1=]. This implies that scal policy should only be used when the zero
lower bound is binding.
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